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CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
Francis C. Sullivan *
COMMENCEMENT BY BILL OF INFORMATION
Article I, section 9 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 required
the commencement of a criminal prosecution to be by grand jury in-
dictment only in capital crimes.' This requirement was expanded in the
1974 constitution to include those crimes punishable by life imprison-
ment. 2 This change resulted from the significant reduction in the number
of capital crimes because of the restrictions placed by the United States
Supreme Court3 upon capital punishment. This constitutional provision
has apparently not received proper attention, since some ten years later
we find some prosecutors still proceeding in violation of the express
dictate of the constitution.
In three recent cases, the courts of appeal were presented with
violations of article I, section 15. Aggravated rape4 provided the problem
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Article I, § 9 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provided in part: "Prosecution
shall be by indictment or information; . . .provided, that no person shall be held to
answer for capital crime, unless on a presentment or indictment by a grand jury .... "
2. Article I, § 15 of the 1974 constitution provides in part: "Prosecution of a felony
shall be initiated by indictment or information, but no person shall be held to answer
for a capital crime or a crime, punishable by life imprisonment except on indictment by
a grand jury."
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, article 382 provides in part: "A prosecu-
tion for an offense punishable by death, or for an offense punishable by life imprisonment,
shall be instituted by indictment by a grand jury."
By way of contrast, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides in part: "An of-
fense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which
may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor shall
be prosecuted by indictment or, if indictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information."
3. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978
(1976).
Code of Criminal Procedure article 933(2) defines a capital offense as "an offense that
may be punished by death."
4. La. R.S. 14:42 (Supp. 1984) provides in part: "[wihoever commits the crime of
aggravated rape shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence."
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in two of these cases. In State v. Gary,5 the second circuit held that it
is reversible error to commence an aggravated rape prosecution by bill
of information, even though the ultimate verdict is "guilty" of a crime
not punishable by life imprisonment.6 Following the traditional rule that
the constitutional provision is mandatory, 7 the court rejected the pros-
ecution's argument that considerations of "precious judicial time and
community and state funds" should render the error harmlessA
The second circuit was faced with the same situation in State v.
Ruple,9 where a prosecution for attempted rape was commenced by bill
of information. Here, however, the trial court granted a defense motion
for mistrial because of this error. Following a new charge of attempted
aggravated rape made by bill of information, the district court denied
defendant's motion to quash based upon double jeopardy grounds and
the court of appeal denied his writ application. The court adhered to
its prior view, holding that the error in charging constituted an illegal
act under article 775(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus au-
thorizing a mistrial.' 0 The court also held that the error may be noticed
ex proprio motu and may not be waived by the defendant. Since the
charge was invalid the court found that the defendant had never been
placed in jeopardy and hence could not assert a valid double jeopardy
claim later when properly charged with the attempt.
In State v. Lott," the first circuit held that commencement of a
prosecution for second degree murder 2 by bill of information constituted
reversible error. Citing as authority cases decided prior to the 1974
Constitution,' 3 the court held that this error was discoverable by mere
5. 445 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984).
6. The defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated rape which is punishable
by imprisonment at hard labor for not more than fifty years. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1) (Supp.
1984).
7. State v. Davis, 385 So. 2d 193 (La. 1980); State v. Donahue, 355 So. 2d 247
(La. 1978).
8. 445 So. 2d at 201 n.3.
9. 437 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
10. Code of Criminal Procedure article 775(3) provides that the court may order a
mistrial when "[tlhere is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment
entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law."
11. 434 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
12. La. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1984).
13. These cases are questionable authority for the proposition cited. State v. Wells,
283 So. 2d 245 (La. 1973), held deficient, without objection, a charge of criminal mischief
under La. R.S. 14:59(7). A defectively stated indictment was held to be error patent on
the face of the record under article 920(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
replacement for La. R.S. 15:503, which defined error patent on the face of the record.
State v. Raby, 259 La. 909, 253 So. 2d 370 (1971), also held that a defectively stated
bill of information could be noticed on appeal ex propio motu. Justices Barham and
Sanders dissented. State v. Butler, 259 La. 560, 250 So. 2d 740 (1971), also involved a
defective statement of aggravated arson in a bill of information. In a 4-3 decision, the
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inspection of the pleadings and should be noticed ex propio motu under
the terms of article 920(2). 14
The message should be clear. The right to be charged by indictment
is a substantial one and the accused is entitled to have the clear provisions
of the constitution observed by prosecutors. This type of error is inex-
cusible at this late date, and by proper attention to such matters,
significant savings in both time and money may be achieved. The charg-
ing process is not a mere formality and should not be considered as
such.
SPEEDY TRIAL
Article 578,15 which sets out the general rules for the time within
which criminal prosecutions must be commenced, and article 579,16 which
establishes certain exceptions which cause the general time period to be
interrupted, continue to present problems. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has long held that the time provisions of article 578 are mandatory 7
and that the proper method of raising non-compliance with this article
is by motion to quash."s When a motion to quash raises the speedy-
trial issue, itis clear that the state is under a heavy burden to show a
court stated in a footnote: "The bill of information is the foundation of the prosecution.
• . . Consequently, if it is fatally defective, a conviction obtained thereunder cannot stand.
And such error, if it exists, is one patent on the face of the record which should be
noted by us ex propio motu." Id. at 742 n.1 (citations omitted).
14. La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2).
15. Code of Criminal Procedure article 578 provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no trial shall be commenced:
(1) In capital cases after three years from the date of institution of the
prosecution;
(2) In other felony cases after two years from the date of institution of the
prosecution; and
(3) In misdemeanor cases after one year from the date of institution of the
prosecution.
The offense charged shall determine the applicable limitation.
16. Code of Criminal Procedure article 579 (as it appeared prior to amendment by
1984 La. Acts, No. 671, § 1) provided as follows:
The period of limitation established by article 578 shall be interrupted if:
(1) The defendant at any time, with the purpose to avoid detection, appre-
hension, or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent
from his usual place of abode within the state; or
(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence
for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond
the control of the state.
The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall commence to run
anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer exists.
17. State v. Stetson, 317 So. 2d 172 (La. 1975).
18. State v. Walgamotte, 415 So. 2d 205 (La. 1982). Code of Criminal Procedure
article 532(7) provides that a motion to quash may be made when "[t]he time limitation
for the institution of prosecution or for the commencement of trial has expired."
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legal cause for the delay. 9 If, in fact, the trial does not begin within
the statutory period, the state will normally attempt to excuse this by
reliance upon one of the statutory bases for interruption of the time
period established by article 579.20 The prosecution, when making this
argument, must overcome a heavy burden to establish the facts justifying
the interruption. 21 In State v. Taylor,22 the supreme court emphasized
the importance of these provisions by granting the defendant's appli-
cation for supervisory writs in a non-appealable misdemeanor case. 23
Justice Calogero, writing for the court, 24 found that there was no clear
showing by the prosecution that the accused was avoiding detection,
apprehension, or prosecution 25 simply by changing his residence twice
without notifying the trial court. The court further held that the sheriff's
ineffectual attempts to serve a subpoena on the defendant did not
constitute the due diligence required of the state by the statute. The
result was, of course, a reversal of the conviction. This result in a
misdemeanor case, although clearly correct, again indicates that from
little mistakes by the prosecution, big problems arise. 26
Under the provisions of article 535(B), 27 a motion to quash on the
ground that the time limit for commencement of trial has expired may
be filed at any time before the commencement of trial. May such a
motion be filed subsequently? In State v. Garbo,2 although the defendant
filed no motion to quash prior to trial, he made it clear on the record
that he was proceeding to trial subject to his right to file a subsequent
motion to quash. Noting that the state did not object at this point and
19. State v. Nations, 420 So. 2d 967 (La. 1982).
20. La. Code Crim. P. art. 579 (as it appeared prior to amendment by 1984 La.
Acts, No. 671, § 1).
21. 420 So. 2d at 967.
22. 439 So. 2d 410 (La. 1983).
23. The charge of driving while intoxicated in violation of La. R.S. 14:98(C) (Supp.
1984) is a misdemeanor not subject to jury trial, and the conviction was thus not appealable.
advised his counsel that he did not wish to testify. Id. at 46.
24. Justice Lemmon dissented without opinion.
25. See generally State v. Campbell, 404 So. 2d 956 (La. 1981).
26. See Sullivan, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Criminal Trial Procedure, 44
La. L. Rev. 301, 304-308 (1983); Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies,
27 Stan. L. Rev. 525 (1975).
27. La. Code Crim. P. art. 535(B) ("A motion to quash on the ground that the
time limitation for commencement of trial has expired may be filed at any time before
commencement of trial.").
2 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice std. 12-4.1 (2d ed. 1980) provides:
If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial,
as extended by excluded periods, the consequence should be absolute discharge.
Such discharge should forever bar prosecution for the offense charged and for
any other offense required to be joined with that offense. Failure of the defendant
or defendant's counsel to move for discharge prior to trial or entry of a plea
of guilty should constitute waiver of the right to speedy trial.
28. 442 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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that the trial court actually heard the matter after trial, the second
circuit found that the state had failed to make the required contem-
poraneous objection to this procedure and the issue was therefore timely
raised. 29 Finding a clear violation of the time provisions of article 578,
the court reversed the conviction and ordered the defendant discharged.
Although recognizing that the grounds for a motion to quash are waived
unless the motion is timely filed,30 the court chose to construe this
provision liberally, to the effect that the grounds for the motion simply
must be made known to the court prior to trial. Considering the nature
of this particular objection-that the trial has not been commenced
timely-it seems quite clear that all motions to quash should not only
be made but disposed of prior to the beginning of the actual trial. It
seems questionable to allow an accused to proceed to trial to have a
complete hearing on the merits, and still allow the question of timeliness
not only to be preserved, but to dispose of the case. There would seem
to be no justification for the discharge of a convicted defendant on
such grounds, and to use the failure of the state to object timely as a
basis for this result seems to be the ultimate in promoting form over
substance. Once an accused is accorded his day in court there should
be few, if any, reversals on grounds that should have been considered
and disposed of prior to trial. Article 92131 should not be ignored.
Pre-arraignment delay seems to be a relatively rare situation today.
Article 701(C) requires that the arraignment be held within thirty days
unless "just cause for a longer delay is shown." '3 2 In State v. Cody,"
the arraignment was timely set, but at the defense attorney's request,
the accused was not arraigned at that time because of a conflict of
interest involving the Indigent Defender's Office. The accused's newly-
appointed counsel then moved to quash the indictment some three months
later. The motion was denied by the trial court. The second circuit
found that while there might be just cause for a thirty day delay, no
such cause appeared for a ninety day delay. The importance of this
case lies primarily in its determination of the proper remedy for a failure
to arraign timely. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides no remedy
for a failure to comply with the thirty day period for arraignment.
29. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841.
30. La. Code Crim. P. art. 535(D) ("The grounds for a motion to quash under
Paragraphs B and C are waived unless a motion to quash is filed in conformity with
those provisions.").
31. La. Code Crim. P. art. 921 ("A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an
appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect
substantial rights of the accused.").
32. La. Code Crim. P. art. 701(C) ("Upon filing of a bill of information or indictment,
the district attorney shall set the matter for arraignment within thirty days unless just
cause for a longer delay is shown.").
33. 446 So. 2d 1278 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
1984]
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Quite properly, the court considered this delay as a general violation
of the accused's right to a speedy trial. It is clear that both the federal
3 4
and Louisiana" constitutional guarantees apply only to delays between
arrest and trial.3 6 The court of appeals therefore applied the traditional
four factor test established by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo' 7
and adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court.38 The four factors to be
weighed in each case are: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for the delay;
(3) the assertion of the defendant's right; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant. In examining the application of these factors in this case the
court found that the defendant failed to assert timely his right to
arraignment and that the delay in arraignment failed to prejudice the
accused. Under modern criminal procedure, it seems unlikely that the
delay in arraignment of a defendant will produce actual prejudice. By
the time of arraignment an attorney will have been appointed for an
indigent defendant and, except in the most unusual cases, there will be
little question as to the nature of the particular charge. All in all, it
should be clear that the major purpose of both the Sixth Amendment
and its Louisiana counterpart is to protect the accused against unrea-
sonable delays in the commencement of his trial, and delays not affecting
the commencement of trial should be disregarded unless the accused can
show actual prejudice accruing from the particular delay.
In the 1984 Regular Session the Legislature amended article 579 by
adding an additional ground for interruption of the limitation period
for the commencement of trial.3 9 The appropriate time period established
by article 57840 is now also interrupted if the defendant fails to appear
for any proceeding where it is shown of record that he received actual
notice of the proceeding. 4' This seems to be an eminently fair and
reasonable provision and should solve some of the difficulties involved
in locating an accused after he has received actual notice of the trial
date.
Also the Legislature amended article 571 to provide that there shall
be no time limit upon the commencement of a prosecution for crimes
34. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
35. La. Const. art. I, § 16.
36. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455 (1971); State v. Dewey,
408 So. 2d 1255 (La. 1982).
37. 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
38. State v. Nowell, 363 So. 2d 523 (La. 1978); State v. Alfred, 337 So. 2d 1049
(La. 1976); see also Gray v. King, 724 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1984).
39. 1984 La. Acts, No. 671, § 1.
40. La. Code Crim. P. art. 578.
41. Code of Criminal Procedure article 579, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, no. 671,
§ 1, now reads: "The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be interrupted
if: . . . (3) The defendant fails to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice,
proof of which appears of record."
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punishable by life imprisonment or by death. 42 This change recognizes
that many crimes formally considered to be capital, and thus not subject
to any time restriction on commencement, are now punishable by life
imprisonment. 43 Although the death penalty is no longer available except
in the case of first degree murder convictions," this amendment is a
legislative recognition of the seriousness of these other crimes.
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
Generally, when a pretrial motion for a change of venue is made,
the accused is complaining that he cannot receive a fair trial in the
particular parish because the potential jurors have been tainted by the
amount and type of publicity. 45 In State v. Kahey,46 however, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court clarified that the motion for change of venue in
this state is equally available in non-jury cases. Article 62247 focuses on
both prospective jurors and witnesses thus recognizing that the effects
of prejudicial pretrial publicity may be as strong upon witnesses as upon
jurors, and may in either case deprive the accused of his constitutional
right to a fair trial. This holding by our supreme court places Louisiana
in accord with the position held by a majority of other jurisdictions.4 1
This is also consistent with the applicable American Bar Association
standard. 4 9 This departure from the rule established in Butzman v. United
States0 clearly recognizes that the waiver of trial by jury really has
nothing whatsoever to do with the issue presented by a motion for
change of venue-whether the accused can receive a fair and impartial
trial in the parish where the prosecution is pending. This is also in
complete accord with the philosophy expressed in the Official Revision
42. As amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 926, § I Code of Criminal Procedure article
571 now reads: "There is no time limitation upon the institution of prosecution for any
crime for which the punishment may be death or life imprisonment."
43. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 571, comment (b). See also, e.g., State v. Batiste,
371 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1979).
44. La. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1984).
45. See, e.g., State v. Goodson, 412 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1982); on remand, 437 So.
2d 1174 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
46. 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983).
47. La. Code Crim. P. art. 622 ("In deciding whether to grant a change of venue
the court shall consider whether the prejudice, the influence, or the other reasons are
such that they will affect the answers of jurors on the voir dire examination or the
testimony of witnesses at the trial.").
48. 436 So. 2d at 481.
49. 2 ABA, supra note 27, std. 8-3.3(e) provides that "[t]he claim that the venue
should have been changed or a continuance granted shall not be considered to have been
waived by the waiver of the right to trial by jury or by the failure to exercise all available
peremptory challenges." The rationale behind standard 8-3.3(e) is contained in its accom-
panying comment: "The elimination of restrictions on the availability of change of venue
and continuance."
50. 205 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953).
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Comment to article 622. 51 It should be clear, however, that defense
counsel's task in a bench trial is a most difficult one, in that he must
convince the trial judge that the pretrial publicity in the particular case
will cause the judge to be unfair to the accused, or that the publicity
will adversely affect the testimony of the witnesses at the trial. It will
be difficult to find a case in which the trial judge will be willing to
make such a ruling. Indeed, in Kahey 2 the supreme court could find
no actual prejudice produced by the publicity nor a presumption of
prejudice under the rules established in State v. Bell."
PUBLIC TRIAL
In a series of recent cases the United States Supreme Court has
been engaged in defining the meaning of the right to public trial as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 4 It is now clearly established that
while both the press and the public have a qualified First Amendment
right to attend a criminal trial," the Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial belongs only to the criminal defendant and not to the public or
the press.56 The court has clarified that the Sixth Amendment does not
grant the accused a constitutional right to compel a private hearing.57
When a trial actually begins for purposes of determining the right
of the public and the press to attend was considered this term by the
Supreme Court. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia,5" the question arose in the context of a voir dire hearing where the
trial court closed the hearing for all but three days of the six-week
interrogation of prospective jurors. The trial court's major consideration
was the protection of the prospective jurors' privacy. The Supreme Court
recognized that in certain circumstances the interrogation of prospective
jurors may give rise to a "compelling interest" in a prospective juror,
51. La. Code Crim. P. art. 622, comment (b).
52. Kahey, 436 So. 2d at 475.
53. 346 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1977). See Sullivan, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-
Criminal Trial Procedure, 44 La. L. Rev. 301, 309 (1983); Sullivan, Developments in the
Law, 1981-1982-Criminal Trial Procedure, 43 La. L. Rev. 375 (1982). See also State v.
Clark, 442 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1983) (discussing the applicable law in a capital case).
54. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .... ").
La. Const. art. I, § 16 ("Every person charged with a crime is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and is entitled to a speedy, public, and impartial
trial .... ").
55. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), on remand,
222 Va. 574, 281 S.E.2d 915 (1981).
56.. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
57. Id.
58. 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
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and may thus result in invasion of legitimate privacy interests of in-
dividual prospective jurors.5 9 Although recognizing the possible privacy
interests of prospective jurors, the Court pointed out that these interests
must be balanced against the presumption of openness applicable to
criminal trials and that trial proceedings may not be closed unless this
presumption is rebutted. Specifically, the Court held that absent con-
sideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court constitutionally could
not close the voir dire examination. The Court established a procedure
whereby the trial court should inform all prospective jurors about the
general nature of sensitive questions which might be put to them, and
then should advise them that any individual believing that public ques-
tioning would prove embarrassing should request an interview with the
trial judge. This would provide the individual an opportunity to present
a specific problem to the court in camera, but with counsel present and
with the matter appearing on the record. Should the matter affirmatively
raised by the juror prove to justify closure, such closure must be limited
only to what is absolutely necessary. The trial judge may order sealed
only such parts of the in camera transcript as will be necessary to protect
the privacy of the individual prospective juror. Thus, it may be said
that the presumption of openness of the criminal trial applies to the
entire trial commencing with the voir dire examination of jurors.6
In Gannett,' the Court considered, but did not decide, whether the
public and the press had a right to attend pretrial suppression hearings.
In that case, however, a majority of the justices did find that the public
had a qualified constitutional right to attend pretrial suppression hear-
ings, although there was no agreement as to whether the right was based
upon the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment. In Waller v.
Georgia,62 in a unanimous opinion, the Court applied the Sixth Amend-
ment public trial guarantee to such suppression hearings. Recognizing
the importance today of suppression hearings,, where in many instances
the case will be finally determined, the Court found no difficulty what-
soever in holding that, under the Sixth Amendment, any closure of a
suppression hearing, over the objection of the accused, must meet the
test established in its prior decisions. 63 Therefore, the party seeking to
59. The court gave an example where a "prospective juror might privately inform
the judge that she, or a member of her family, had been raped but had declined to seek
prosecution because of the embarrassment and emotional trauma from the very disclosure
of the episode." Id. at 825.
60. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in separate written opinions,
104 S. Ct. at 826, 827, 829.
61. 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898.
62. 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984).
63. For application of these standards, see State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135 (La.
1982); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); United States Department
of Justice Policy with regard to Open Judicial Proceedings, 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1983).
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close the hearing must show some overriding interest likely to be prej-
udiced if the hearing is open. The closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider and find
insufficient all other reasonable alternatives to closure, and the court
must make findings on the record sufficient to support the closure
order. 64 It would now seem that the right to public trial under the Sixth
Amendment is applicable only to a criminal defendant, and the right
of the public and the press under both the First and Sixth Amendments
extend to both trial and pretrial proceedings. Although closure may be
justified in some situations, the burden will be very heavy to establish
circumstances sufficient to rebutt the presumption of openness established
by the Supreme Court. The prudent and cautious district judge will no
doubt require a most extensive showing of possible prejudice to either
the accused or, in a proper case, a prospective juror before resorting
to the extreme step of closure.
May a trial judge exclude from the courtroom adult spectators during
the testimony of a prosecution witness? The first circuit in State v.
Raymond65 answered in the affirmative, in a trial for indecent behavior
with a juvenile." Although recognizing that the accused possesses a right
to a public trial under both the federal 67 and state constitutions, 68 the
court held that this right is subject to the trial judge's authority to keep
order in the courtroom and to prevent the "unnecessary pressures or
embarrassment to a witness. 69 The trial judge had excluded the adult
children of the defendant's wife from the courtroom while she was
testifying, based upon her claim that their presence inhibited her tes-
timony. The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion, stating that
a trial judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, exclude spectators
during the testimony of a witness in a criminal case if reasonably
necessary to prevent embarrassment or emotional disturbance of the
witness or to enable the witness to testify to relevant facts. 70 Certainly
the trial judge has the complete power to control. the proceedings, but
under current rulings of the United States Supreme Court rarely will a
trial judge be authorized to exclude non-witness adult spectators from
the courtroom during testimony. A witness normally has no right to
refuse to testify except under the terms of a specific testimonial privi-
lege. 71 It would seem that absent some physical disturbance, not present
here, a witness should be compelled to testify, under threat of the
64. See, e.g., State v. Raymond, 447 So. 2d 51 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
65. Id.
66. La. R.S. 14:81 (Supp. 1984).
67. U.S. Const. amends. VI & XIV, § 1.
68. La. Const. art. I, § 16.
69. 447 So. 2d at 53.
70. 447 So. 2d at 53 (citing State v. Poindexter, 231 La. 630, 92 So. 2d 390 (1956)).
71. State v. Jones, 363 So. 2d 455 (La. 1978).
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appropriate contempt sanction if necessary;72 however, contempt should
not be used if it is clear to the trial judge that the testimony can be
obtained only through exclusion of specific persons, and that the con-
tempt remedy would merely punish the witness and not produce testimony
necessary to the specific proceeding. This is a very difficult situation
for the trial judge since he is dealing with a constitutional right of the
accused which must be protected unless there is a most compelling reason.
Whether partial exclusion of spectators can be shown to prejudice the
accused is really the question at issue. Should the defendant benefit
from the absence of testimony of a prosecution witness having knowledge
of relevant facts simply because the witness, despite contempt action,
refuses to testify in the presence of these spectators? May the accused
show that the obtaining of relevant testimony against him through
exclusion of certain spectators is sufficiently prejudicial as to require a
reversal? This commentator believes that so long as there is no wholesale
exclusion of spectators which amounts to closure, there is no violation
of the accused's right to a public trial. The accused cannot be said to
be entitled to the presence of members of the press and the public in
general. At the same time it should be recognized that the trial judge's
power to exclude spectators should be exercised with great restraint and
that all other means of obtaining the particular testimony of the witness
should first be explored and eliminated and certainly the record should
clearly show the reasons for exclusion."
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In a series of decisions the United States Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Sixth Amendment 4 to require the assistance of counsel
for one accused of crime in any instance where a jail sentence is
imposed. 7 As to right to counsel, therefore, one accused of crime has
three basic choices: (1) an absolute right to retain counsel of his choice; 76
(2) the right to have the court appoint competent counsel for him;" or
(3) he may act as his own attorney. 7 These rights are exclusive, and
72. Code of Criminal Procedure article 21(4) sets out one of the acts that will be
considered a direct contempt: "Refusal to take the oath or affirmation as a witness, or
refusal of a witness to answer a nonincriminating question when ordered to do so by the
court."
73. See La. R.S. 15:469.1 (1981); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 102 S. Ct. 2613; see also Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom: Attending, Reporting,
Televising Criminal Cases, 57 Ind. L. J. 235 (1982).
74. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See also La. Const. art. I, § 13.
75. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).
76. State v. Harper, 381 So. 2d 468 (La. 1980); State v. Adams, 369 So. 2d 1327
(La. 1979).
77. City of Monroe v. Wyrick, 393 So. 2d 1273 (La. 1981).
78. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975); see also La. Code
Crim. P. art. 511.
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the defendant has no constitutional right, federal or state, to joint
representation (i.e., to act as co-counsel with an attorney). 79
In the case of self-representation, it is customary for the trial judge
to appoint standby counsel to assist the accused even over the objection
of the accused.8 0 This is done in recognition of the difficulties involved
where one unskilled in the law and criminal procedure attempts to
conduct his own defense. The role of standby counsel has always been
fraught with uncertainty. There has been a serious and substantial lack
of guidance for the attorney appointed to stand by and assist a criminal
defendant, and whether his role should be active or passive has been
left to the individual personality and inclination of the specific attorney.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court clarified the role of standby
counsel in McKaskle v. Wiggins."1 The Court quite correctly pointed
out that the trial is that of the defendant and not of counsel. As the
majority opinion by Justice O'Connor stated, the right of the accused
to self-representation under Faretta
plainly encompasses certain specific rights to have his voice
heard. The pro se defendant must be allowed to control the
organization and content of his own defense, to make motions,
to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question
witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate
points in the trial.12
What then is the role of standby counsel, especially one who is
appointed over the defendant's specific objection? In this case, the
defendant complained that his defense was impaired by the distracting,
intrusive, and unsolicited participation of standby counsel. The Supreme
Court, however, refused to reduce standby counsel to the role of speaking
only when spoken to. Certainly the accused must have an adequate
opportunity to present his case in his own way, but this does not mean
that standby counsel may not participate in the proceedings, especially
to bring to the attention of the court matters favorable to the accused.83
The court noted the distinction between proceedings in the presence of
79. State v. McCabe, 420 So. 2d 955 (La. 1982); State v. Bodley, 394 So. 2d 584
(La. 1981); State v. Booker, 444 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
80. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
81. 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984). Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. Justices White,
Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
82. Id. at 949.
83. 1 ABA, supra note 27 std. 6-3.7 provides:
When a defendant has been permitted to proceed without the assistance of
counsel, the trial judge should consider the appointment of standby counsel to
assist the defendant when called upon and to call the judge's attention to matters
favorable to the accused upon which the judge should rule on his or her motion.
Standby counsel should always be appointed in cases expected to be long or
complicated or in which there are multiple defendants.
[Vol. 45
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84
the jury and those before the trial judge alone, outside of the jury's
presence. In the first category it is important that the actions of standby
counsel do not substantially interfere with the actual jury perception
that the defendant is representing himself. Thus, counsel should not
interfere with any significant tactical decisions of the accused, attempt
to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak in place of the
defendant on any matter of importance. To do so would violate the
accused's constitutional right. In proceedings outside the presence of the
jury, standby counsel may play a more active role. The defendant,
however, must be allowed to address the court freely on his own behalf,
and in the event of conflict or disagreement between the defendant and
standby counsel, the view of the accused must prevail. This should pose
no problem so long as the trial judge is careful to recognize the voice
of the accused as the primary expression of the defense's point of view.
The Supreme Court refused to prohibit the unsolicited participation of
standby counsel, especially when it is either outside the presence of the
jury or with the consent of the defendant, either expressed or implied.
As Justice O'Connor so neatly stated: "We recognize that a pro se
defendant may wish to dance a solo, not a pas de deux. Standby counsel
must generally respect that preference." '8 4 This opinion is must reading
for all attorneys appointed as standby counsel as well as all trial judges
involved in Faretta-type cases. These situations call for the exercise of
sound discretion by the trial judge and great restraint by standby counsel.
A simple rule of thumb might well be: when in doubt, the views of
the defendant should be accepted completely. In no sense should a
cautious and careful attitude on the part of the standby counsel be
construed as inadequate assistance, whether this amounts to participation
or non-participation so long as not requested by the accused.
The Supreme Court in this term also illuminated the murky question
of what constitutes adequate assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. In United States v. Cronic,85 the Court considered the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantee,8 6 holding
that the right to effective assistance of counsel is the accused's right to
require the prosecution's case "to survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing."8 7 This requires an actual confrontation between the
prosecution and the defense. Since the lawyer is in every case presumed
to be competent to provide adequate assistance, the defendant has the
burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance in violation of his consti-
tutional right. As an exception to this, prejudice will be presumed when
84. 104 S. Ct. at 956
85. 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
86. Defendant's retained counsel was allowed to withdraw shortly before trial. The
trial court then appointed a "young lawyer with a real estate practice" and allowed him
only twenty-five dats for preparation of a complicated mail fraud case. Id. at 2041.
87. Id. at 2045.
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counsel is either totally absent or is in some way prevented from assisting
the accused during a critical stage of the proceedings.a Specifically, the
Supreme Court held that the five factors set out by the court of appeals 9
are relevant to a determination of effective assistance, but that they do
not separately or in combination exclusively constitute a basis for a
finding of ineffective assistance.9 0 The Court held that if the facts of
a particular case do not demonstrate that the defense counsel completely
failed to function in any meaningful sense as the government's adversary,
the defendant can make out a claim of ineffective assistance only by
pointing to specific errors made by the attorney. In the case at hand
the Court reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to consider
the impact of the alleged specific errors by counsel. 91
Continuing its interpretation and explanation of the right to counsel,
the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington92 proceeded to set out
more specific guidelines. The bench mark for judging any claim of
ineffective assistance is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process as to put in doubt the
justice of the trial result. 93 If the defendant is to be successful in obtaining
relief based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must
show first that the performance of the attorney was deficient and second
that this deficient performance so prejudiced the accused as to deny his
right to a fair trial. Further, the Court held that the proper standard
for judging the performance of defense counsel is that of reasonably
effective assistance, considering all of the circumstances-an objective
standard of reasonableness. The Court specifically noted that the judicial
evaluation of an attorney's performance must be "highly deferential,"
and that there must be a. fair and reasonable evaluation which will avoid
the distorting effects of hindsight. The requirement that the accused
demonstrate prejudice requires that the defendant demonstrate a rea-
sonable probability that but for the unprofessional errors of counsel,
the result would have been different. A reasonable probability, according
to the Court, is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome
of the proceeding, considering all of the evidence presented. Justice
O'Connor, again writing for the majority, warned that there are no
mechanical rules or easy answers for the determination of the very
88. Id. at 2047. See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932).
89. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd, United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039
(1984).
90. The five factors are: (1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2)
the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible
defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel. Id. at 1129.
91. Justice Marshall concurred in the result. 104 S. Ct. at 2052.
92. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
93. This is true even in a sentencing proceeding in a capital case such as Strickland.
Id. at 2055 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Marshall, J., dissenting).
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difficult and complicated factual issues that arise. Fundamental fairness
is, of course, the basic consideration, and the effect of the attorney's
default upon fairness must be judged as to whether it constitutes a
breakdown in the adversarial process. Under the principles established
in this case, the defendant must show, based upon the entire record,
both specific defective performance by the attorney and that this defective
performance produced a wrong result. This is certainly no easy task in
the average case, and it can be anticipated that the multitude of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which are so much the rule today,
will produce few reversals in the future. This should be a great relief
for the appointed counsel who has been the butt of much undeserved
criticism in the past. 94
In perhaps the year's outstanding example of chutzpah, 95 counsel
for the defendant in the trial court in State v. Adams" also represented
the defendant on appeal. On appeal he argued that his own representation
of the accused in the trial court was so ineffective as to deny the accused
his Sixth Amendment rights, thus requiring a reversal. As can be ex-
pected, Judge Domengeaux, writing for the third circuit, swiftly and
effectively torpedoed this venture stating: "We consider that appellant's
rather nebulous request on this assignment extends the bounds of proper
advocacy before the judicial system. . . . (It) has no merit, and in fact
it is regrettable that we have to lend it dignity by ruling on it."'97 This
should effectively deter others from raising such arguments.
Problems with withdrawal by defense attorneys generally are found
where the attorney takes the initiative for various reasons or where the
defendant is attempting to obtain a different attorney, or perhaps even
where the intent is to delay the commencement of trial. In State v.
Broadway,9" defendant urged on appeal that the trial judge erred in
denying his attorney's motion to withdraw made after the commencement
of trial. The motion was based on the defendants' lack of trust and
dissatisfaction with the appointed counsel. The court treated this as a
delaying tactic and upheld the discretion of the trial judge in denying
the motion. In so doing, the court pointed out that the right to counsel
must be exercised at a reasonable time and cannot be manipulated to
obstruct the orderly procedure of the courts or to interfere with the
fair administration of justice. Further, the court held that there is no
constitutional right of an accused to make a new choice of counsel on
the very day that a criminal trial is set to commence. Although this is
94. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
95. "Chutzpah is of Yiddish origin. It means that a person has gall, moxie, nerve
and audacity compounded with brazen assertiveness." State v. Strickland, 400 A.2d 451,
452 n.1 (Md. App. 1979) (Gilbert, C.J.).
96. 446 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984).
97. 446 So. 2d at 369.
98. 440 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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not a new proposition, this case should serve to alert both defense
counsel and trial judges to the necessity of making certain that the mere
allegation of constitutional rights does not distort the criminal process
and the very purpose of the particular constitutional right. "Playing the
game" by defendant, and unfortunately many times by their attorneys,
does little to serve the ends of justice. It should be scrupulously avoided
and where it is discovered swift and sure action should be taken.
Although an accused has the right to counsel, this right may be
waived either expressly or impliedly. Judge Savoie presented an excellent
discussion of the doctrine of implied waiver of counsel in State ex rel
Johnson v. Maggio.99 Trial courts should assure that dilatory conduct
on the part of a criminal defendant does not, under the guise of right
to counsel, unduly delay a criminal trial. The use of the doctrine of
implied waiver is a perfectly constitutional and effective method of
avoiding this.-
DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS
The Louisiana Constitution makes it perfectly clear that every person
charged with a crime is entitled to testify in his own behalf. 10. However,
nowhere in the Code of Criminal Procedure is there any specific reference
to the time within which the defendant must or may exercise this right.
Common sense dictates that usually, if defendant exercises his right to
testify, he should do so during the presentation of the defense's case.
In State v. Caillier,0 2 the third circuit was presented with a situation
in which the defense rested without presenting any testimony from the
accused. After the prosecutor began to present her closing argument the
defense counsel interrupted, and subsequently, in the absence of the
jury, informed the court that the defendant had at that point indicated
his desire to testify. 03 The trial court refused to reopen the case to
allow the defendant to testify, finding that the defendant had simply
changed his mind, and was not the victim of a misunderstanding. On
appeal, the court relied upon article 765(5), the normal-order-of-trial
article. 104 The third circuit found that the defendant's right to testify
must be exercised timely. Thus the defendant has an absolute right to
testify during the presentation of his evidence, if any. After that time,
and prior to the beginning of closing arguments, it is within the discretion
of the trial judge to allow additional evidence, including the testimony
99. 449 So. 2d 547 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
100. See State v. Harper, 381 So. 2d 468 (La. 1980).
101. La. Const. art. 1, § 16.
102. 450 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984).
103. There appeared to be some disagreement as to whether the accused had previously
advised his counsel that he did not wish to testify. Id. at 46.
104. La. Code Crim. P. art. 765.
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of the accused. After closing arguments begin, the trial court has no
authority to allow any additional testimony, including the testimony of
the accused. 05 The court of appeals is completely correct in saying that
there is no authority in either the code or the jurisprudence authorizing
a trial judge to permit the defendant in a criminal case to present his
own testimony after closing arguments have begun. One wonders, how-
ever, whether this does not place an excessive amount of reliance upon
what is really a housekeeping provision. This commentator would hesitate
to exclude such testimony simply because the order of trial article of
the code does not specifically so authorize. The language of comment
C to article 765,106 of course is not the law. It is excessively formal
and restrictive, in the judgment of this commentator, and should be
disregarded by the courts in the future. There is absolutely no reason
why a district judge should not have complete discretion to vary the
technical order of proof, particularly where such variance is requested
by the defendant and in no way can operate to his prejudice. If the
courts continue to lay such stress upon this formalistic article, it certainly
should be ripe for amendment by the Legislature to assure not only a
neat but a just trial.
On the other side of the coin is the situation where the accused
exercises his right to testify but, when the going gets rough on cross-
examination, refuses to answer specific questions. State v. Viera'0 7 is
such a case. On cross-examination in this narcotics case, the defendant
refused to answer a question as to where he obtained the marijuana in
question because he would be "framing" his source. At this point, the
trial judge, in the presence of the jury, held the accused in contempt
for his refusal to answer a relevant question. The court of appeals
upheld the action of the trial court on the basis of article 21(4)108 (the
contempt article) and further found that the trial judge had properly
exercised its discretion in not removing the jury. It is not clear that the
accused requested the court to remove the jury from the courtroom
during the contempt proceedings. However, assuming that the accused
105. State v. Bonanno, 373 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1979).
106. Code of Criminal Procedure article 765, comment (c) provides:
The provision of C.C.P. Art. 1632, which authorizes the court to vary the
order when circumstances justify, is omitted from this article, because it seems
dangerous in criminal cases. Variations can occur, of course, if the defendant
does not object, but the court should not have the power to order variations
over the defendant's objection.
107. 449 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
108. Code of Criminal Procedure article 21(4) sets as out one of the acts that will
be considered direct contempt: "Refusal to take the oath or affirmation as a witness, or
refusal of a witness to answer a nonincriminating question when ordered to do so by the
court .... "
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did so in a timely and proper manner, article 794"' 9 seems to require
the removal of the jury since the contempt proceeding is a matter to
be decided by the court alone.
It is quite clear that no witness has the right to refuse to answer
a relevant question except under the terms of a proper and applicable
testimonial privilege. °10 When the defendant chooses to testify, the law
is quite clear that he or she is to be treated just as any other witness,"'
and this election to testify constitutes a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination."12 The trial court should be quick to enforce the
obligation of all persons to testify in response to relevant questions. To
do otherwise would make it impossible for the criminal trial to perform
its function of determining the truth from geniune disputed facts.
PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT
Like death, taxes, and the poor, the disruptive defendant seems to
be with us always. Handling the unruly defendant without allowing the
trial to degenerate into an alley-brawl is a problem frequently presented,
but without any easy solution. It is now well established that the con-
frontation clause of the Sixth Amendment grants the accused the right
to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial."' The right
to confrontation, although not absolute, requires that the courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of the right. " 4 In Illinois
v. Allen"' the Supreme Court authorized three methods for dealing with
the obstreperous defendant: (1) bind and gag him and allow him to
remain in the courtroom; (2) cite the accused for contempt of court
and allow him to remain in the courtroom; or (3) remove the accused
from the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly." 6
The Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted these rules and has applied
them in a very fair manner." 7
109.
The court may, and at the request of the state or a defendant shall, remove
the jury from the courtroom when the court hears matters to be decided by
the court alone. The court may remove the jury from the courtroom at any
time when considered in the best interest of justice.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 794.
110. State v. Jones, 363 So. 2d 455 (La. 1978).
111. State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 So. 2d 801, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947);
State v. Walker, 204 La. 523, 15 So. 2d 874 (1943).
112. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973); see also State v. Parker, 436 So. 2d
495 (La. 1983).
113. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S. Ct. 136 (1892); State v. Ranker,
359 So. 2d 129 (La. 1978).
114. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
115. 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970).
116. Id. at 343-44, 90 S. Ct. at 1061.
117. State v. Lee, 395 So. 2d 700 (La. 1981); State v. Rochon, 393 So. 2d 1224 (La.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana was faced with a particularly
outrageous situation in State v. Shank. "8 Here, in a first degree murder
case, the defendant embarked upon a course of what can only be
described as outrageous behavior, including threatening to kill the jury,
pounding on the table, and refusing to go into the courtroom during
a hearing on pretrial motions. This case also illustrates the hazards faced
by appointed counsel as the defendant at one "point jumped across the
counsel table, struck his appointed counsel, knocked him to the floor
and began to strangle him. The accused also requested that he be removed
from the courtroom and that he be restrained. The trial judge warned
the accused on several occasions that he would be bound and gagged
if he continued to disrupt the trial and finally was forced to order that
sanction. On appeal the argument was made that the conviction and
sentence should be set aside because of the prejudicial impact on the
jury which was caused by the defendant's own disruptive conduct. The
supreme court, quite properly, reacted strongly, indicating that defend-
ant's outbursts seemed timely and pointed to support of his plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity. Quite clearly this conduct was a tactical
maneuver by the accused, and it is probably true that this is the usual
cause of such behavior. Relying upon the early cases of Falk v. United
States"19 and State v. Wiggins,'20 the court found that "One charged
with a crime cannot be permitted to subvert the ends of justice by his
own intentional conduct.''2 Quite clearly one cannot have his cake and
eat it too. The right of confrontation is designed to protect an accused
and does not in any sense exist to be used and misused as a tactical
device to obtain a reversal of an otherwise proper conviction.
Unfortunately, it has become necessary in recent years to direct more
attention to security in our courtrooms. Various precautions have been
implemented to protect the judge, attorneys, witnesses, and bystanders,
the simplest and most common being the placement of large numbers
of law enforcement officers throughout the courtroom. The United States
Court of Appeal, for the Eleventh Circuit recently considered this prob-
lem of balancing the right of the accused to be tried without physical
restraints against the necessity of courtroom security. 122 Those concerned
with courtroom security would be well advised to become familiar with
this well-written and reasoned opinion.
1981).
118. 448 So. 2d 654 (La. 1984).
119. 15 App. D.C. 446 (1899).
120. 337 So. 2d 1172 (La. 1976).
121. 448 So. 2d at 659.
122. Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409 (lth Cir. 1984).
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WITNESSES
The right of a defendant in a criminal case to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his behalf is guaranteed by both the federal1
23
and state constitutions. 24 This right to compulsory process is the right
of an accused to demand subpoenas for the attendance of desired
witnesses, and the corresponding right to have such subpoenas served
by the state. Article 731 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 25
provides for the issuance of subpoenas. The process is a simple one
and yet we continue to see questions raised in the appellate courts,
primarily because of a failure of defense attorneys to understand and
follow the rules. There is clearly no denial of compulsory process where
the accused does not subpoena a particular witness. 26 Typically the
defense relies on the prosecution to subpoena witnesses and therefore
does not have its own subpoenas issued or served. This is well-illustrated
in State v. Green, 2 7 where an informant in a narcotics case was sub-
poenaed as a witness by the state but, prior to trial, was released by
the prosecutor from the subpoena. The defense obtained an instanter
subpoena but it was never served and there was no objection or request
for relief by the accused. The accused's failure to timely and properly
subpoena the witness directly caused the absence of the witness and the
second circuit quite properly held that the accused had failed to exercise
the statutory due diligence. This is simply another example of an attorney
failing to follow closely the status of the case prior to trial and ensure
that the means of making a defense will be available. The unfortunate
part of this, of course, is that the client, not the attorney, suffers as
a result.
State v. Marallo2 s is another example, albeit a hard one, of the
rule that the prosecution is under no obligation to produce witnesses
for the defense. If a defendant wishes to obtain the presence of a
witness, it is clearly the responsibility of the defense to issue its own
subpoenas and there is no right to rely upon the state to do so. The
constitutional right to compulsory process is important, but the proper
steps must be taken to exercise the right effectively.
State v. Lee 29 is another example of the fact that the right to
compulsory process is not self-operating. Here, defense witnesses were
123. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
124. La. Const. art. I, § 16.
125. "The court shall issue subpoenas for the compulsory attendance of witnesses at
hearings or trials when requested to do so by the state or the defendant. Clerks of court
may issue subpoenas except as provided in Article 739." La. Code Crim. P. art. 731.
126. Beach v. Blackburn, 631 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1980).
127. 448 So. 2d 782 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
128. 449 So. 2d 1078 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
129. 446 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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subpoenaed by the defendant but one witness refused to honor the
subpoena. At this point the defendant did not request that the witness
be arrested, nor did he request the issuance of an instanter subpoena,
and in fact counsel failed to object when the trial proceeded without
this particular witness. The failure to take the proper steps to enforce
the subpoena and particularly the failure to object 30 operates as a waiver
of the constitutional right, and the accused will not be heard to complain,
either post-trial or on appeal. It is surprising how often attorneys fail
to exercise fully the rights of their clients at the proper time and place.
Our courts are now making clear that procedural rules must be complied
with fully and that the failure to comply will not be a ground for
reversal on appeal.
SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESSES
Article 764's' seems to have become a favorite source of appeals in
recent years. Based upon the biblical story of Susanna and the Elders,3 2
sequestration is designed to prevent witnesses from being influenced by
the testimony of other witnesses and to allow effective cross-examination
concerning the witness's personal knowledge.' In State v. Johnson,114
the question was whether the accused was entitled to sequester witnesses
during the voir dire examination in a first degree murder case. In a
very thorough and comprehensive opinion, Justice Blanche, writing for
the court, pointed out that the language of article 764 is mandatory. 35
As a result, when timely and properly tequested by either the state or
130.
An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected
to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires
the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the
grounds therefor.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 841.
131.
Upon its own motion the court may, and upon request of the state or the
defendant the court shall, order that the witnesses be excluded from the court-
room or from where they can see or hear the proceedings and refrain from
discussing the facts of the case or the testimony of any witness with anyone
other than the district attorney or defense counsel. The court may modify its
order in the interest of justice.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 764.
132. See Daniel and Susanna, in The New English Bible: The Apocrypha 188-90 (S.
Sandmel Oxford Study ed. 1976).
133. State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983); State v. Kimble, 407 So. 2d 693
(La. 1981).
134. 438 So. 2d 1091 (La. 1983).
135. 438 So. 2d at 1095.
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the defendant, the trial judge has no discretion, but must grant the
motion for sequestration. The only independent power of the court
under article 764 is to modify the order of sequestration in the interest
of justice. 3 6 The question left open by article 764 is when the motion
for sequestration may be made. Put another way, the question really
is whether sequestration should apply only after the actual presentation
of evidence has commenced. The court held that sequestration applies
at the voir dire stage and that, when properly requested at that stage,
the trial judge must order sequestration.
It appears to this commentator that this is a close question. Se-
questration is designed primarily to prevent one witness from hearing
and being influenced by the testimony of other witnesses. It is true,
however, that the voir dire of prospective jurors does disclose some
information concerning the particular occurrence, and thus it could have
a serious impact upon the subsequent testimony of witnesses. Although
the court ultimately found that the failure to grant the defendant's
motion for sequestration did not prejudice the accused and therefore
was harmless error, the principle is now firmly established that the trial
judge, upon timely and proper request, must grant such a motion.
Everything considered, this is a perfectly reasonable result and is a good
example of how a trial judge, at no cost and with no effort or prejudice
to anyone, may go the extra mile to afford an accused the fullest
protection against even inadvertent prejudice. 3 7
At the other end of the trial spectrum is the closing argument of
counsel. The question presented in State v. Pettaway38 was whether the
trial judge erred in enforcing the rule of sequestration during closing
arguments against witnesses who were members of the accused's family.
Normally a rule of sequestration is satisfied when the witnesses are
excluded during presentation of evidence, and it is the usual practice
to allow witnesses to remain in the courtroom once their testimony has
been given. The second circuit pointed out that article 76419 does not
specify the portions of the proceeding during which witnesses must be
excluded. Apparently, the ruling of the trial judge was based upon a
fear that the presence of these family-member witnesses might distract
the jury and perhaps result in disruption. The court of appeal found
no error in the conduct of the trial judge, primarily because the order
applied to all witnesses, and further, because the accused made no
136. State v. George, 346 So. 2d 694 (La. 1977).
137. For a discussion of the application of the constitutional right of access to voir
dire examinations, see infra text accompanying note 187.
138. 450 So. 2d 1345 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984). In State v. Nicholas, 444 So. 2d 298
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), the court upheld the order of the trial court lifting the rule
of sequestration to allow the victim to hear the closing arguments.
139. La. Code Crim. P. art. 764.
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contemporaneous objection. In addition, the defendant was unable to
demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the sequestration, as one would
expect. It is questionable that the presence of these witnesses could have
in any way contributed to a different result in the case, and it is therefore
clear that this decision is correct. It would seem, however, that the
proper procedure for a defendant who might wish to have defense
witnesses present after they testify would be to ask the court to modify
its ruling under the provisions of article 764. 4 It should be noted,
however, that such a request should be made as soon as the particular
witness has completed his entire testimony, including cross-examination,
re-direct and re-cross examination, if any.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana had occasion during this reporting
period to consider the remedy to be applied where a defense witness
violates an order of sequestration.141 Under article 764,142 the trial judge
certainly possesses discretion to disqualify a witness from testifying where
the witness has violated an order of sequestration. 143 However, the
constitutional right of the accused to present his defense' 44 requires that
a trial judge walk cautiously in using the extreme remedy of preclusion.145
The supreme court, following the rule established by the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,'" has established for Louisiana the rule
that a defense witness may be precluded only where the violation took
place with the consent, connivance, procurement or knowledge of either
the defendant or his counsel. 147 In State v. Warren,'" it was quite clear
that the trial judge excluded the testimony of a defense witness erro-
neously since there was no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the
witness's violation of the order of sequestration was with the consent,
connivance, pr.6curement or knowledge of the defendant or defense-
counsel. The supreme court, however, chose to apply the harmless error
rule to this trial error and thus affirm the conviction.
Certainly reviewing courts must have a substantial degree of flexi-
bility in applying the harmless-error doctrine. However, application of
the rule based upon pure speculation as to the importance or, worse,
the possible content of the testimony of a defense witness, is to substitute
the judgment of-the reviewing court for that of a jury as to the weight
•140. Id.
141. State v. Warren, 437 So. 2d 836 (La. 1983).
142. See supra note 131.
143. La. Code Crim. P. art. 764. See also State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837 (La.
1983); State v. Kimble, 407 So. 2d 693 (La. 1981).
144. La. Const. art. 1, § 16.
145. State v. Lewis, 250 La. 876, 199 So. 2d 907 (1967).
146. Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972).
147. State v. Jones, 354 So. 2d 530 (La. 1978). See also State v. Boutte, 384 So. 2d
773 (La. 1980).
148. 437 So. 2d 836 (La. 1983).
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of relevant evidence and seems to run perilously close to a violation of
the accused's right to present his defense as guaranteed by the Louisiana
Constitution. 149 One wonders whether this is simply a technical error
which could not effect the outcome of the case. This type of decision
by a trial judge should not, in the judgment of this commentator, be
subject to second-guessing at the appellate level, which reduces to a
very substantial extent the importance and value of the constitutional
right to trial by jury. From the point of view of the trial judge, there
should be very strong proof of some connivance by the defendant or"
his counsel before the extreme remedy of preclusion should be applied.
It should be remembered that contempt is the primary 5 ° and prefered
remedy for such violations.' 5'
TRIAL By JURY
Size
One would think that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution'5 2
and of Article 782153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are perfectly
clear and would require little interpretation. Unfortunately, they have
been the source of much litigation and have also been interpreted so
149. La. Const. art. 1, § 16.
150. "Unlike former R.S. 15:371, this article does not disqualify the witness for
disobedience of the provisions of this article. However, after the court instructs the witness
as provided by this article, a violation is a contempt." La. Code Crim. P. art. 764,
comment (b). "Contumacious failure to comply with a subpoena or summons to appear
in court, proof of service of which appears of record" is an act that is considered as a
direct contempt under La. Code Crim. P. art. 21(2).
151. The Louisiana Courts of Appeal considered a number of cases this term involving
questions concerning sequestration of witnesses. See State v. Taylor, 451 So. 2d 691 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1984); State v. Wilkerson, 448 So. 2d 1355 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied,
450 So. 2d 361 (1984); State v. James, 447 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); State
v. White, 446 So. 2d 1317 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 957 (1984); State
v. Daigle, 439 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); State v. Huntley, 438 So. 2d 1188
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
152. Article I, § 17 of the constitution provides in part:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before
a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case
in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.
A case in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement
without hard labor for more than six months shall be tried before a jury of
six persons, five of whom must concur to render a verdict.
153. Code of Criminal Procedure article 782 provides in part:
Cases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a jury of twelve
jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in which punishment
is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of
twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in which
the punishment may be confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury
composed of six jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
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as to require reversals in a substantial number of cases. 5 4 During this
reporting period the third circuit, in two cases,' faced situations where
the accused was tried by a jury of twelve where the proper size, under
both the constitution and the code, should have been a jury of six.
Both cases resulted in reversals with new trials being ordered. This
holding is mandatory since the Louisiana Supreme Court has continued
to stand by the rule that a verdict returned by a jury composed of
either more or less than the proper number is a nullity. 5 6
How an error of such dimension can occur remains a mystery.
Certainly the primary and original responsibility must be on the pros-
ecutor to determine, from the nature of the charge, the proper size of
the jury. The trial judge must also bear a substantial amount of re-
sponsibility to assure that the constitutional and code provisions are
properly applied. In addition, defense counsel must be charged with
knowlege of the proper size of the jury, and, in the judgment of this
commentator, a failure to raise this question timely and properly in the
trial court should result in a waiver of any error.' This is particularly
true when the defendant is entitled to six jurors but receives trial by
twelve, clearly more than he is entitled to. The tactical position of the
defendant in such a case is clear. Under the present state of the law a
defendant is in the very pleasant position of being able to try the case
on the merits and, if a guilty verdict is returned, being able to annul
the proceeding on appeal and receive a second chance in the trial court.
This is contrary to all recognized principles of judicial administration,
and tends to make a mockery out of the administration of criminal
justice. The rule is bad, unnecessary, and should be changed. Until this
occurs, it certainly behooves all participants at the trial level to pay
more attention to the absolute basics of criminal procedure. Errors such
as this are difficult to excuse as mere inadvertance.
Waiver of Trial by Jury
Trial by jury in Louisiana is considered a very important right of
an accused in a criminal case, and quite properly any attempted waiver
of this right is looked upon with disfavor and examined accordingly.
154. See Sullivan, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Criminal Trial Procedure, 43
La. L. Rev. 375, 388 (1982); and cases cited in n. 93 therein.
155. State v. Pollard, 438 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 443 So.
2d 1125 (La. 1984); State v. Gary, 445 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
156. State v. Marcantel, 388 So. 2d 383 (La. 1980); State v. Nedds, 364 So. 2d 588
(La. 1978).
157.
An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected
to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is
unneccesary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires
the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the
grounds therefor.
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It is clear both under the constitutions' and the Code of Criminal
Procedure'59 that the right to trial by jury may be knowingly and
intelligently waived except in capital cases.
In implementing the waiver provisions, the supreme court has con-
sistently refused to adopt a rule which would require the trial judge to
personally advise the defendant of his right to a jury trial. 160 This is
quite the opposite from the requirement that the trial judge must advise
the defendant personally as to all of the trial rights which are waived
by a plea of guilty. 16' In two recent cases 62 the Louisiana Supreme
Court refused to change the prevailing rule. However, both cases indicate
mounting concern with this problem. Both cases indicate that the better
practice would be for the trial judge to conduct a colloquy with the
accused, advising the defendant personally on the record of his right
to trial by jury and requiring the defendant to waive the right personally
either in writing or by an oral statement in open court on the record.13
This is in conformance with the American Bar Association standards
La. Code Crim. P. art. 841.
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of
any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial
rights of the accused.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 921. See also State v. Jenkins, 406 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (La. 1981)
(Lemmon, J. dissenting).
158. La. Const. art. I, § 17.
159.
A defendant charged with any offense except a capital offense may knowingly
and intelligently waive a trial by jury and elect to be tried by the court. At
the time of arraignment, the defendant in such cases shall be informed by the
court of his right of waiver and election.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 780.
Article 782(B) provides: "Trial by jury may be knowingly and intelligently waived
by the defendant except in capital cases."
160. State v. Phillips, 365 So. 2d 1304 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979);
State v. Muller, 351 So. 2d 143 (La. 1977).
161. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969); State v. Godejohn,
425 So. 2d 750 (La. 1983).
162. State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983), and State v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 272
(La. 1983).
163. See Commonwealth v. Abreu, 391 Mass. 777, 463 N.E.2d 1184 (1984), where
the court stated:
In Ciummei v. Commonwealth, . . . we established an evidentiary prerequisite
to a valid waiver of the right to trial by jury. We stated that a judge must
conduct a colloquy with the defendant on the record, regarding the defendant's
right to trial by jury, contemporaneously with and before accepting any waiver.
The purpose of the colloquy is to include as part of the trial record evidence
indicating whether the defendant's waiver of his right was sufficient to pass
constitutional scrutiny .... In the exchange, the judge will advise the defendant
of his constitutional right to a jury trial, and will satisfy himself that any waiver
by the defendant is made voluntarily and intelligently." . . . While the United
States Constitution did not, and does not, require that such a colloquy be
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for criminal justice.' 64 As Justice Lemmon puts it: "Ideally, the judge
should endeavor to determine the defendant's understanding and inten-
tion, preferably other than by leading questions calling for simple af-
firmative answers.' 65
This writer certainly agrees that the colloquy procedure is the pref-
erable way to handle the waiver of the right to trial by jury. It would
not be at all surprising to have this requirement established in Boykin
v. Alabama. 166Even if this should not occur, it seems that the Louisiana
Supreme Court could adopt this as the rule of law for this state.
Suggestions by this court as to "better practice" or "the more favored
procedure" only serve to postpone actual decision and leave the matter
in a fuzzy and unclear state for the persons who must deal with it on
a day by day basis-the trial judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
If the supreme court refuses to provide the required degree of leadership
in this area, the Legislature should take swift action to amend article
780 of the Code.' 67
Composition of Juries
Since the United States Supreme Court established the constitutional
rule that juries in criminal cases must represent a fair cross-section of
the community, we have had much jurisprudence interpreting this re-
quirement.' 6 The Louisiana Constitution provides the basic qualification
for jurors and authorizes the supreme court to provide by rule for the
exemption of jurors.' 69 This provision is implemented in the Code of
conducted on the record .... we deemed it necessary "in aid of sound judicial
administration."
. . . Whether a colloquy conducted by a trial judge before accepting a
defendant's waiver of his right to trial by jury is adequate depends upon the
specific facts of each case. . . . So long as a colloquy occurs, the sole focus
of our review is whether the colloquy has provided an evidentiary record upon
which the trial judge could find the waiver of a defendant was voluntary and
intelligent.
Id at 782-84, 463 N.E.2d at 1186-87 (citations omitted) (quoting Ciummei v. Common-
wealth, 378 Mass. 504, 392 N.E.2d 1186 (1974)).
164. 3 ABA, supra note 27, std. 15-1.2(b) provides that: "(1) a defendant be advised
of the right to jury trial; (2) the defendent, if choosing to waive, do so personally; and
(3) the defendant do so either in writing or in open court for the record."
165. State v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 272, 275 n.6 (La. 1983).
166. 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
167. See also State v. Bissett, 451 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); and State v.
Boult, 440 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983), particularly the contrary views of Judge
Hall, concurring in part and dissenting in part. See id. at 769.
168. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S. Ct. 2163 (1972).
169. Louisiana Constitution article V, § 33 provides: "(A) A citizen of the state who
has reached the age of majority is eligible to serve as a juror within the parish in which
he is domiciled. The legislature may provide additional qualifications. (B) The supreme court
shall provide by rule for exemption of jurors."
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Criminal Procedure by article 401, setting out the general qualifications
of jurors. 70 In State v. Kirts,171 in considering a charge of racial im-
balance in the make-up of the petit jury venire, the third circuit, relying
upon the provisions of article 419,172 continued to apply the general rule
concerning the burden of proof in such cases. The defendant has the
burden of establishing either fraud or that some other irreparable injury
was caused by the particular process of jury selection. 73 The court
pointed out that article 419 is intended to prevent frivolous attacks upon
venires where the selection process was the result of good faith efforts
by a particular jury commission to comply with the legal requirements
for selecting juries. It should be a rare case today where an accused
after conviction can properly show that his conviction was tainted by
improper actions of the jury commission.
One such case reached the supreme court in this term. In State v.
Jacko174 the supreme court reversed a conviction because of the method
used by the jury commission to select persons for the general venire.
Apparently, all persons entitled to personal exemptions under the terms
of Supreme Court Rule No. XXV' 7" were excluded from the general
venire automatically. This resulted in an automatic exclusion of all such
170. In order to qualify to serve as a juror, a person must:
(1) Be a citizen of the United States and of this state who has resided within
the parish in which he is to serve as a juror for at least one year immediately
preceding his jury service;
(2) Be at least eighteen years of age;
(3) Be able to read, write, and speak the English language;
(4) Not be under interdiction, or incapable of serving as a juror because of
a mental or physical infirmity; and
(5) Not be under indictment for a felony, nor have been convicted of a felony
for which he has not been pardoned.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 401.
171. 447 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (on reh'g).
172.
A general venire, grand jury venire, or petit jury venire shall not be set aside
for any reason unless fraud has been practiced or some great wrong committed
that would work irreparable injury to the defendant.
This article does not affect the right to challenge for cause, a juror who is
not qualified to serve.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 419.
173. State v. Liner, 397 So. 2d 506 (La. 1981).
174. 444 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1984).
175.
This court finds that the exemption of the following groups or occupational
classes is in the public interest and, accordingly, members of such classes are
exempt from jury service:
(a) Public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the
Government of the United States, or the State, or any subdivision thereof, who
are actively engaged in the performance of official duties;
(b) Members in active service in the Armed Forces of the United States and
members of the National Guard of this State while on active service;
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persons where, as authorized by article 403,176 the exemptions provided
by the supreme court are not exclusions from service, but only exemp-
tions which must be exercised personally. Although there appears to be
no specific information available concerning how many persons entitled
to an exemption actually exercise it, it seems to be general knowledge
that most such persons do in fact exercise the exemption. Based upon
this, it is understandable that a particular jury commission might, in
good faith, wish to short-cut the procedure by simply omitting persons
entitled to a personal exemption from the general jury rolls.
The supreme court, following its previous decision in State v.
Procell177 found that such actions result in a situation where certain
qualified persons are never given an opportunity to serve upon juries
and that any trial jury resulting from this selection process is improperly
constituted. As a result, the court felt compelled to reverse the conviction
and to remand the case for a retrial by a properly selected jury. Justices
Watson and Lemmon dissented, 7 both believing that it was not necessary
to reverse the conviction because of this error, but that the simple
solution to the problem was to issue an order under the supervisory
jurisdiction of the court to correct the improper jury selection procedure.
The view of the dissenters seems eminently sound. It would avoid the
great expense and delay involved in a retrial of the case on what in all
fairness must be considered a technicality. A criminal defendant has no
right to the presence of certain people on the jury, 79 but only to a fair
and impartial jury. As indicated above, the burden is upon the accused
to show that the selection process actually prejudiced him. 80 This is
particularly true if article 419 is to be given its intended meaning. It
should be noted that the persons directly affected-those entitled to
exemptions who are not given the opportunity to serve-were not parties
to this particular case. Thus we have the court giving to the accused a
substantial benefit when, in fact, this can have no effect whatsoever
upon the persons not permitted to serve. It seems that some corrective
language should be added to article 419 to prevent the reoccurrence of
cases similar to Jacko.
(c) Members of paid fire or police departments of the State or any subdivision
thereof and federal law enforcement officers;
(d) Members of the following groups when regularly and actively engaged in
the practice of their professions: attorneys at law, ministers of religion, chi-
rooracters, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and optometrists;
(e) All persons over seventy years of age.
La. Sup. Ct. R. 25, § 2 in West's Louisiana Rules of Court 1984 [hereinafter cited
without cross reference as La. Sup. Ct. R.].
176. La. Code Crim. P. art. 403.
177. 332 So. 2d 814 (La. 1976).
178. Justice Marcus concuried.
179. State v. Stephenson, 291 So. 2d 767 (La. 1974).
180. State v. Liner, 397 So. 2d 506 (La. 1981).
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Usually there is no accounting for all persons subpoenaed who fail
to appear for jury duty. It is not at all unusual for a relatively small
number of the persons actually summoned to appear for actual service.
Does an accused have a right to have the missing prospective jurors
attached and brought to court or at least accounted for? The Louisiana
cases have established that the defendant in a criminal trial has no such
right to demand either the attachment of absent jurors or an accounting
for their absence. 8 ' This rule was reiterated recently in State v. Guin.82
This commentator completely agrees with this analysis. The defendant
is entitled only to a fair and impartial jury and should not be heard
to speculate about what might have occurred had other persons been
available for selection. The defendant must show either fraud or irre-
parable injury, 83 and this seems impossible where the complaint is simply
that the court failed to require the presence of all persons selected for
the general venire. Whether any of these might have actually been selected
to serve, and what the result might have been should one or more of
those persons have served, is pure speculation.
The Legislature in the 1984 Regular Session'8 4 amended article 401,185
dealing with the general qualifications of jurors, and also added new
article 401.1 .186 The main effect of these changes is to make clear that
no person shall be disqualified for jury duty solely because of the loss
181. State v. Morgan, 315 So. 2d 632 (La. 1975); State v. Witherspoon, 292 So. 2d
499 (La. 1974).
182. 444 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
183. La. Code Crim. P. art. 419.
184. 1984 La. Acts, No. 655, § 1.
185. Code of Criminal Procedure article 401 now reads:
A. In order to qualify to serve as a juror, a person must:
(4) Not be under interdiction or incapable of serving as a juror because of
a mental or physical infirmity, provided that no person shall be deemed in-
competent solely because of the loss of hearing in any degree.
B. Notwithstanding any provision in Subsection A, a person may be chal-
lenged for cause on one or more of the following:
(1) A loss of hearing or the existence of any other incapacity which satisfies
the court that the challenged person is incapable of performing the duties of
a juror in the particular action without prejudice to the substantial rights of
the challenging party.
(2) Where reasonable doubt exists as to the competency of the prospective
juror to serve as provided for in Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 787.
186. La. Code Crim. P. art. 401.1:
When a person with a hearing loss is empaneled on a jury, the court shall:
(1) Provide, at court expense, an interpreter for the deaf juror. The interpreter
shall be sworn in as an officer of the court.
(2) Instruct the interpreter, in the presence of the jury, to:
(a) Make true, literal, and complete translations of all testimony and other
relevant colloquy to the deaf juror during the deliberations of the jury.
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of hearing in any degree. Article 401.1 provides for the use of an
interpreter should a deaf juror be selected to serve. Only time will tell
what the effect of this legislative action will be, but it seems highly
questionable to establish such special legislation for certain disabled
persons. It would appear that we will be faced in the future with appeals
based upon the inability of specific jurors to properly participate in the
proceeding because of loss of hearing, thus denying a fair trial to the
convicted defendant. Of particular concern are the provisions permitting
an interpreter to be present and to assist a deaf juror during the
deliberations of the jury. One must have serious doubts as to whether
the injection of additional persons into the deliberations is a good faith
compliance with the traditional strong feelings of the sanctity of the
sworn jurors and the protections adopted to assure that their deliberations
will be conducted entirely in secret. One is led ineluctably to the con-
clusion that this is a provision not in the best interest of the admin-
istration of the criminal justice system. It should also be noted that the
Supreme Court of Louisiana on November 1, 1983, amended section 4
of Rule 25.187 The effect of the amendment is simply to allow the jury
commission to exclude from the general venire persons who have served
as either grand or petit jurors for an extended period of time.
Voir Dire Examination of Jurors
In Louisiana, the accused in a criminal trial is clearly entitled to a
full voir dire of prospective jurors."'s The scope of the examination is
(b) Refrain from participating in any manner in the deliberations of the jury.
(c) Refrain from having any communications, oral or visual, with any member
of the jury regarding the deliberations of the jury except for literal translations
of jurors' remarks made during deliberations.
(3) Permit the interpreter to be present and assist a deaf juror during the
deliberations of the jury.
(4) Give a special instruction to the interpreter not to disclose any portion
of the deliberations with any person following the verdict.
B. The verdict of the jury shall be valid notwithstanding the presence of the
interpreter during deliberations.
187.
The jury commission shall not include in, and shall delete from, the general
venire the names of those persons who have served as grand or petit jurors in
criminal cases or as trial jurors in civil cases or in a central jury pool during
a period of two years immediately preceding their selection for jury service;
individual district courts may increase this two year period to a four year period
by local rule of court. However, if the name of such a person is included in
a general venire, that person may claim an exemption from jury service or may
waive the exemption.
La. Sup. Ct. R. 25 § 4.
188. La. Const,. art. 1, § 17 ("The accused shall have the right to full voir dire
examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily. The number of
challenges shall be fixed by law.").
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left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, 8 9 and as is usual in the
case of the exercise of discretion by a trial judge, his rulings will not
be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.' 90 Our supreme
court has traditionally required that wide latitude be given the accused
during voir dire in order that the defense may properly exercise its right
to challenge prospective jurors both for cause and peremptorily.19' The
court has had much difficulty in determining whether the accused has
a right to submit particular questions to the prespective jurors, and
among the most troublesome areas has been the right of the accused
to require the state to provide rap sheets showing the arrest and con-
viction records of prospective jurors.
In State v. Jackson, 92 the supreme court was again asked to establish
a rule requiring disclosure of such information by the state for the use
at voir dire by the defense. Justice Marcus, writing for the court, disposed
of the matter succinctly:
The criminal records of prospective jurors may be useful to the
state in its desire to challenge jurors with inclinations or biases
against the state. But they are not pertinent to the purpose of
defendant's voir dire: to challenge jurors whom defendant be-
lieves will not approach the verdict in a detached and objective
manner. Whatever the practical desire of trial counsel, the rec-
ognized purpose of full voir dire is not to pack the jury with
persons favorable to the defendant or to the state.'93
This appears to be a distinction without a reasonable basis. It should
be remembered that the constitutional right to voir dire is that of the
defendant, whereas the state possesses only a statutory right. Considering
this, it seems totally unrealistic to create some sort of different relevancy
rule for the state than for the defense. It is- difficult to think of a
substantial reason why the state should not disclose the rap sheets of
prospective jurors when they not only have them in their possession,
but intend to use this information in conducting the voir dire for the
state. It need not be presumed, as seems to be the case, that the defense
is seeking the information only in an attempt to seat as jurors those
who have been convicted, or at least arrested, and therefore may be
more favorable to one in a similar position. The fact of conviction or
arrest and the nature of the crime, and, of course, the result, are
certainly matters that any responsible defense counsel would wish to
189. La. Code Crim. P. art. 786 ("The scope of the examination shall be within the
discretion of the court.").
190. State v. James, 431 So. 2d 399 (La.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 (1983); State
v. Allen, 380 So. 2d 28 (La. 1980).
191. State v. Robinson, 404 So. 2d 907 (La. 1981).
192. 450 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
193. Id. at 628.
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know in order to conduct the voir dire intelligently and to challenge
both for cause and preemptorily. This commentator feels that this inter-
pretation is inconsistent with both the modern view,1 94 and the philosophy
expressed in the discovery provisions of the code. 95 It should be noted
that the court did not reach the question of whether such information
might be privileged as part of the prosecutor's work product.' 96
A companion problem of continuing difficulty, particularly in the
fourth circuit, is the question of the accused's right to obtain prospective
jurors' voting records which are in the possession of the state and are
to be used by the state in conducting its voir dire. State v. Blunt 97
provides an excellent discussion of this problem by Judge Garrison. The
applicable law is well stated as follows:
It is well settled that in order to obtain the voting records held
by the prosecution, the defendant must show that the records
are necessary to prevent undue prejudice, hardship or injury to
the defendant. . . . The two-pronged test which defendant must
satisfy is: (1) that the defense cannot practicably obtain the
information, and (2) that the state intends to use the information
in selecting the jury. 19a
As in the case of rap sheets, this commentator disagrees strongly
with this rule. Again, in this situation there appears to be little reason
for denying the information to the defense. What possible, reasonable
objection can be made to making this information available prior to
questioning the prospective jurors? If our purpose is, as it should be,
to speed the process of voir dire, without adversely affecting the con-
stitutional rights of the accused, one very simple solution is to make
available, through discovery and prior to voir dire, all information which
can be considered reasonably necessary for the proper conduct of the
defense voir dire. 199
As proof that truth is really stranger than fiction, consider the case
of State v. Delahoussaye.200 During voir dire in this first degree murder
194. 3 ABA, supra note 27, std. 15-2.2 provides:
Before voir dire examination begins, the court and counsel should be provided
with data pertinent to the qualifications of the prospective jurors and to matters
ordinarily raised in voir dire examination, including name, sex, age, residence,
marital status, education level, occupation and employment address, previous
service as a juror, and present or past involvement as a party to civil or criminal
litigation.
195. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 716-729.6.
196. See State v. Holmes, 347 So. 2d 221 (La. 1977).
197. 449 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
198. Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
199. See also State v. Robinson, 442 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
445 So. 2d 437 (La. 1984); State v. Hughes, 436 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 So. 2d 732 (La. 1983).
200. 443 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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case, after four jurors had been selected and sworn, defendant for the
first time learned that a local minister of the gospel had delivered an
invocation to the entire jury venire. Apparently the invocation quoted
scripture verse and was in the nature of "a death for a death" statement.
At a hearing on the defendant's motion for a mistrial, the minister read
aloud in open court the same scripture verses he had earlier read to
the jury venire. 201 The minister also at that point repeated, to the best
of his recollection, the explanation of the scripture which he had earlier
given to the jury venire.20 2 The trial court called four prospective jurors
at random to determine what effect, if any, this invocation had upon
them, and allowed defense counsel to examine these persons. Of the
four, only three had been present when the minister delivered the in-
vocation and all three believed that he was speaking with the judge's
permission. Each was also thoroughly impressed that "a man of the
cloth" was advocating death as the punishment for first degree murder. 20 3
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial because, although it did
not approve of the delivery of this invocation, it did not find that it
prejudiced the defendant. In a very thorough opinion by Judge Knoll,
the third circuit disagreed, reversed the conviction and remanded for a
new trial. Pointing out that the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that the integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized
by unauthorized invasions, 2°4 the court stated:
The trial court should take such steps to protect the jury from
prejudicial influences that frustrate due process and invite con-
stitutional risks and hazards. The jury must give the defendant
his day in court with the detached atmosphere prevailing and
the trial court should invoke the proper measures to insure this
protection. 20 5
201.
And if anyone kills a person the murderer shall be put to death on the evidence
of witnesses but no person shall be put to death on the testimony of one
witness. Moreover, you shall accept no ransom for the life of a murderer. He
is guilty of death and he shall be put to death.
Id. at 649-50.
202.
[W]e as subjects of the State of Louisiana are to abide by its laws and that
the civil magistrate is to bear the sword not in vain but to execute justice on
the evil doer. And so the remarks that came in the prayer subsequent to that,
were basically that the Lord would give us the wisdom and grace to adjudicate
this matter properly as would please him and not us.
Id. at 650.
203. Id.
204. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450 (1954).
205. 443 So. 2d at 651.
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Both the trial court and defense counsel believed that further ex-
amining the prospective jurors concerning this matter could only em-
phasize the matter to the defendant's disadvantage. As a result, defendant
was denied the proper use of voir dire, the very device designed to
determine whether any prejudice exists on the part of a prospective
juror. This the court found to constitute substantial prejudice depriving
the accused of the right to a fair trial.
With this conclusion, this commentator heartily agrees. To allow
this conviction to stand would surely deny the accused his constitutional
right to a fair trial. This situation never should have occurred, but when
the trial judge first learned of the incident it would seem that the best
course would have been immediately to declare a mistrial. This would
effectively have protected the right of the accused and at the same time
have avoided the necessity of trying this case twice. It is interesting, to
note that the court of appeal avoided a discussion of the problem of
requiring the accused to show actual prejudice by invoking the doctrine
of implied bias. If ever there was a case in which the doctrine of implied
bias should *be invoked, rather than requiring the defendant to dem-
onstrate actual bias, this is one."'
Although a civil case, McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.
Greenwood"" should apply to criminal cases. In this case, a prospective
juror failed to respond to a question asked of the entire panel, resulting
in a failure to disclose relevant information. The Supreme Court refused
to overturn the result of the trial,20 8 holding that to obtain a new trial
in such a situation, the losing party must first demonstrate that a juror
failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then
that a correct answer by the prospective juror would have required the
granting of a challenge for cause. Justice Rehnquist suggested that this
rather common problem probably results from a misunderstanding of
the question on the part of the prospective jurors. "[J]urors are not
necessarily experts in English usage. Called as they are from all walks
of life, many may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are
relatively easily understood by lawyers and judges. ' ' 2°9 One further state-
ment by Justice Rehnquist deserves mention:
To invalidate the result of a three-week trial because of a juror's
mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on
206. See the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 222, 102 S. Ct. 940, 948 (1982).
207. 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984).
208. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Stevens and O'Con-
nor joined. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice
Marshall joined.
209. 104 S. Ct. at 849.
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something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be
expected to give. A trial represents an important investment of
private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end
of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the per-
emptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of
information which objectively he should have obtained from a
juror on voir dire examination 10
All courts would do well to observe this principle in considering
minor technical errors during the course of a trial.
211
Substitution of Alternate Jurors
The jurisprudence in Louisiana is quite clear to the effect that the
defendant in a criminal case has a right to have his case decided by
the particular jurors selected and sworn to sit in his case.2"2 To hold
otherwise would adversely affect the accused's constitutional right to
examine prospective jurors and to challenge both for cause and preemp-
torily. Because of this, a juror once selected and sworn may not be
discharged unless there is some legal cause, such as death, illness or
some other substantial legitimate cause.2 13 Due to the problems of modern
life and especially to the longer duration of trials, article 789214 was
placed in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure to provide for the
selection of alternate jurors who might be used .prior to the commence-
ment of deliberations should one or more regular jurors become unable
to perform or be disqualified from performing their duties. This provision
was designed to avoid the necessity of declaring a mistrial in the in-
creasingly likely situation of inability of the original jury to complete
the trial. In State v. Clay,215 the first circuit was confronted with the
210. Id. at 850.
211. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982); Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 96 S. Ct. 1017 (1976).
212. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971); State v. Cass, 356
So. 2d 396 (La. 1977).
213. State v. Clay, 441 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So.
2d 1213 (La. 1984).
214. La. Code Crim. P. art. 789 provides in part:
The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel
be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors, in the order
in which they are called, shall replace jurors who become unable to perform
or disqualified froin performing their duties priQr to the time the jury retires
to consider its verdict. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner,
shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and
challenges for cause, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions,
powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors.
215. 441 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1213 (La.
1984).
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question as to whether a juror should be allowed individually to make
the determination of unavailability. In this case, on the morning of the
second day of trial, a juror telephoned the trial court stating that she
was unable to attend the trial because of "some accident or a problem
in her family that requires her presence. 2 6 The trial judge announced
this communication in open court and replaced the juror with an al-
ternate. Unfortunately, the court of appeal chose to stress heavily the
question of the accused's right to be present 2 7 rather than to consider
the case as squarely presenting the problem of the denial of the accused's
right to voir dire, since the juror was never brought into open court
and subjected to examination by counsel. As Judge Lottinger put it:
The trial judge here reacted in a prudent manner in replacing
the juror. He could have done little else except to direct the
sheriff to round up (the juror) for questioning, which would
only have been proper had he not believed she had a pressing
family problem or accident which required her presence. The
defendant's right to have the original twelve jurors selected
decide his fate and his right to be present at certain stages of
the proceeding are not absolute. Ample cause was present to
discharge the juror, and defendant's absence at the ex parte
hearing was unavoidable.
2 8
It would seem that this analysis does not adequately consider that,
by upholding the action of the trial judge in this case, the court effectively
denied the accused his right to inquire into the existence of the statutory
grounds for substitution. In fact, the juror is not allowed to make the
decision concerning further jury service, and the telephone conversation
between judge and juror is a dubious method of accurately determining
whether there has been, not only compliance with article 789, but also
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. One might well ask why
the juror should not be brought before the court and subjected to ex-
amination, not only by the court, but also by defense counsel in the
presence of the accused as to the factual basis for the disqualification
of the juror. Only in this way can an adequate record be made and the
matter properly presented, if necessary, before the court of appeal. In
the judgment of this commentator this is not an area in which informality
should be approved.
23 9
216. 441 So. 2d at 1231.
217. Id.
218. 441 So. 2d at 1231. See State v. Copeland, 419 So. 2d 899 (La. 1982).
219. See the excellent discussion of this problem in Green v. Zant, 715 F.2d 551 (11th
Cir. 1983). See-also United States v. Rodriques, 573 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
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OPENING STATEMENTS
Only infrequently in the past have the Louisiana appellate courts
had occasion to review questions dealing with the opening statements
of counsel. This term proved to be the exception, with a number of
cases coming before the various courts.
The opening statements of counsel are frequently confused with
closing arguments, and, in fact, frequently are referred to erroneously
as opening arguments. Opening statements are designed to serve as the
table of contents for the trial. This is intended to make more under-
standable the evidence which will follow. Our system relies upon the
piecemeal presentation of evidence, bits and pieces being presented by
various witnesses, in addition to the possible use of real evidence and
documentary evidence. Except in the most simple cases, it is necessary
to give the trier of fact, either judge or jury, some idea of what each
party intends to prove so that the trier of fact may make some sense
out of the individual isolated pieces of evidence as they are presented.
As our courts have put it: "The primary function of the prosecutor's
opening statement is to set forth in general terms the nature of the
charge sufficiently to enable the jury to follow the proceedings." 220 It
should be noted that the opening statement is not an argument by
counsel. 2 1 Article 766 specifies the scope of the state's opening statement:
"[It] shall explain the nature of the charge, and set forth, in general
terms, the nature of the evidence by which the state expects to prove
the charge. '2 2 It has frequently been stated by our courts that the scope
and extent of the opening statement is within the wide discretion of the
trial judge and that a conviction will not be set aside for error in an
opening statement unless some substantial right of the accused is plainly
violated. 223 This has been interpreted to mean that the state must set
forth its theory of the case in general terms in the opening statement,
but that it is not necessary that the state set out every piece of evidence
which will be presented. A general description of the evidence has been
held to be sufficient.22 4 Article 769 applies the scope rule to the sub-
sequent introduction of evidence by the prosecution. 22 This makes it
220. State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La. 1981); State v. Kendig, 451 So. 2d 124
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); State v. Kohler, 434 So. 2d 1110, 1123 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1983).
221. See State v. Frezal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973); State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672,
243 So. 2d 793 (1971).
222. La. Code Crim. P. art. 766.
223. State v. Palmer, 448 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); State v. Brown, 428
So. 2d 438 (La. 1983).
224. State v. Behn, 445 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984); State v. Chapman, 410
So. 2d 689 (La. 1982); State v. Edwards, 406 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1981).
225.
Evidence not fairly within the scope of the opening statement of the state
shall not be admitted in evidence.
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clear that there is no requirement that the state, in its opening statement,
detail every particular piece of evidence to be presented. Under article
767 the state is prohibited from referring in any way in its opening
statement to either a confesssion or an inculpatory statement made by
the defendant, 226 and article 768 requires written notice to the defendant
before the state's opening statement if it intends to introduce into
evidence either a confession or inculpatory statement, unless such in-
formation has been made available during discovery. 227 The term "in-
culpatory statement" has been defined as an admission of incriminating
facts made by the defendant after, not before or during, the commission
of the charged crime. 22s The jurisprudence has distinguished res gestae
statements from inculpatory statements and held that the former may
be referred to during the state's opening statement without notice being
given under article 768.229 As might have been expected from the nature
of the opening statement, a reference to evidence which later proves to
be inadmissible for any reason is not a ground for mistrial or for
reversal on appeal. 23 0 An exception to this general rule exists where the
defense can show either bad faith by the prosecutor or clear and sub-
stantial prejudice. 23' It should not be overlooked, however, that in order
to preserve any error for appeal the accused must make a contempor-
aneous objection. 23 2
The secondary purpose of the opening statement is to inform the
defendant of the nature of the charge and the evidence to prevent the
accused from being unfairly surprised. 233 However, the importance of
this has diminished significantly since the adoption of the discovery
If the state offers evidence that was inadvertently and in good faith omitted
from the opening statement, the court, in its discretion may admit the evidence
if it finds that the defendant is not taken by surprise or prejudiced in the
preparation of his defense.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 769.
226. "The state shall not, in the opening statement, advert in any way to a confession
or inculpatory statement made by the defendant." La. Code Crim. P. art. 767.
227.
Unless the defendant has been granted pretrial discovery, if the state intends
to introduce a confession or inculpatory statement in evidence, it shall so advise
the defendant in writing prior to beginning the state's opening statement. If it
fails to do so a confession or inculpatory statement shall not be admissible in
evidence.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 768.
228. State v. Michel, 422 So. 2d 1115 (La. 1982); State v. Jackson, 450 So. 2d 1053
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
229. State v. Belgard, 410 So. 2d 720 (La. 1982). See La. R.S. 15:447 (1981).
230. State v. Green, 343 So. 2d 149 (La. 1977); State v. Williams, 438 So. 2d 1212
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
231. 410 So. 2d at 724.
232. La. Code Crim. P. art. 841. See also State v. Sims, 346 So. 2d 664 (La. 1977).
233. State v. Bolen, 338 So. 2d 97 (La. 1976).
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provisions. 2 4 If the accused needs the opening statement of the pros-
ecution for information such as this, only disaster will result. At this
point the sound of cell doors can be heard closing in the background.
INSTRUCTIONS
Under the provisions of article 801235 a written jury charge may be
requested by either the defense or the state before the first witness is
sworn. If this is done the court "shall" deliver a copy of the written
charges to both parties before reading the charge to the jury. A simple
reading of the article would cause one to believe that the meaning is
clear and unambiguous, but such may not be the case. In State v.
Jackson,23 6 the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that in order to obtain
appellate review of a trial court's failure to honor the timely request
of defense counsel, a contemporaneous objection 23 7 must also be made.
Such a ruling, of course, tends to water down the mandatory nature
of the article and also tends to negate its very purpose. The purpose
clearly is to require that the charge be reduced to writing, at the option
of either party, so that there might be no misunderstanding as to the
nature of the statement of the law that the judge will give fo the jury.
It has the great advantage of avoiding the hazards of extemporaneous
discourses on very complicated legal matters and also should provide
counsel, prior to closing arguments, with the knowledge of precisely
how the jury will be instructed. 238 Although there is some disagreement
as to the desirability of giving written charges, 23 9 the decision of the
drafters of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure was to leave the
matter to the discretion of the parties. When this discretion has been
exercised, it would seem that the statutory process has been invoked
and counsel should not be required to urge this matter by objecting to
the trial court's failure to follow the mandate of the code. The con-
temporaneous objection rule is indeed a most desirable one and is a
234. La. Code Crim. P. art. 716-729.6.
235. Code of Criminal Procedure article 801 states:
The court shall reduce its charge to writing if it is requested to do so by either
a defendant or the state prior to the swearing of the first witness at the trial
on the merits. The court's written charge shall be read to the jury. The court
shall deliver a copy thereof to the defendant and to the state prior to reading
it to the jury.
236. 450 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
237. La. Code Crim. P. art. 841. See Sullivan, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-
Criminal Trial Procedure, 44 La. L. Rev. 301, 327 (1983).
238. In some areas oral charges are not routinely recorded by the court reporter.
239. 3 ABA, supra note 27, std. 15-3.6(e) provides: "(e) Before the taking of evidence,
the court may give preliminary instructions to the jury deemed appropriate for their
guidance in hearing the case. After the arguments are completed, the court should give
the jury all necessary instructions." See United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374 (llth Cir. 1982).
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clear protection against shotgun appeals, but at the same time it should
not be used to avoid the clear requirements and dictates of the code.
This is indeed form over substance.
It will be noted that article 801 also provides that when counsel
timely and properly requests a written charge, the court "shall deliver
a copy" to the parties prior to charging the jury. 240 In State v. An-
derson,2 4' the accused properly requested a written charge and received
a copy of the charge the trial judge intended to use. The trial judge
then held an instruction conference with the parties, and the proposed
charge was discussed and some changes were made. No copy of the
amended charge was provided to counsel. The third circuit found that
defense counsel had not requested a copy of the amended charge and
also failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the trial judge's
failure to make available to him a copy of the amended charge. The
court stated: "Although it may be argued that it would have been more
consonant with the spirit and intent of La. C. Cr. P. Art. 801 for the
trial court to have provided defendant a copy of the amended charges,
we cannot say that reversible error occurred." 242 This disposition of the
matter seems to be quite fair and in keeping with the philosophy of
holding an instruction conference. Where, as here, the defense is per-
mitted to propose the finished product, there seems to be absolutely no
reason why, absent a specific request, the trial court should be required
to furnish to counsel a copy of the amended charge. The conference
itself fulfills the purpose of the provision of written instructions, and
is a most desirable procedural device. 243
REASONABLE DOUBT
In at least four cases during this reporting period 244 the supreme
court continued to struggle with the requirement of article 804245 relating
240. La. Code Crim. P. art. 801.
241. 440 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
242. 440 So. 2d at 214.
243, 3 ABA, supra note 27, std. 15-3.6(d) provides in part:
At a conference on instructions, which should be held out of the hearing of
the jury, and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury, counsel
should be afforded an opportunity to object to any instruction tendered by
another party or prepared at the direction of the court. The court should advise
counsel what instructions will be given prior to their delivery and, in any event,
before the arguments to the jury.
See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.
244. State v. Vessell, 450 So. 2d 938 (La. 1984); State v. Clark, 446 So. 2d 293 (La.
1984); State v. Rault, 445 So. 2d 1203 (La. 1984); State v. Ester, 436 So. 2d 543 (La.
1983).
245. Code of Criminal Procedure article 804 states:
A. In all cases the court shall charge the jury that:
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to charges defining reasonable doubt. In several other cases246 the courts
of appeal found themselves lost in an attempt to interpret and apply
the holdings of the supreme court. Most significant of these cases is
State v. Rault,247 which limited the holding of State v. Mack248 to the
effect that article 804 must be read to the jury. Under Rault, the Mack
directive was modified to approve either a reading of article 804 or the
giving of instructions "substantially equivalent" to article 804.249 This
must be considered a step backward. This case is indicative of the
ambivalent attitude of the courts in this area. 250 It seems obvious that
a clear and consistent standard must be adopted in this area since this
is a matter of concern to all trial judges as well as trial counsel and
is a problem that must be faced in every single criminal trial. This is
not the place to wait for a definitive determination indefinitely. The
fault, of course, lies initially with those district judges who continue to
believe that they can achieve the Hall of Fame by coming up with a
clear, concise and accurate definition of the presumption of innocence
or reasonable doubt better than that provided in the code. Many have
tried but, to my knowledge, no one has succeeded. By far, the safest
course is to follow the sensible Mack approach and to read only the pro-
visions of article 804. To go beyond this is indeed rash and flirts with
the ever present possibility of reversal. This commentator firmly believes
that Professor McCormick was totally correct when he stated that "ex-
planations [of reasonable doubt] themselves often need more explanation
than the term explained." 2 5 '
(1) A person accused of crime is presumed by law to be innocent until each
element of the crime, necessary to constitute his guilt, is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt;
(2) It is the duty of the jury, in considering the evidence and in applying to
that evidence the law as given by the court, to give the defendant the benefit
of every reasonable doubt arising out of the evidence or out of the lack of
evidence in the case; and
(3) It is the duty of the jury if not convinced of the guilt of a defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt, to find him not guilty.
The court may, but is not required to, define "the presumption of innocence"
or "reasonable doubt" or give any other or further charge upon the same than
that contained in this article.
246. State v. Moore, 439 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); State v. Gomez, 433
So. 2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
247. 445 So. 2d 1203 (La. 1984).
248. 403 So. 2d 8 (La. 1981).
249. La. Code Crim. P. art. 804.
250. See Sullivan, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Criminal Trial Procedure, 43
La. L. Rev. 375, 399 (1982).
251. McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence § 341, at 800 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972). See also Marshall, J., dissenting on denial of certiorari in Adams v. South
Carolina, 104 S. Ct. 558 (1983):
I continue to believe that trial courts err when they instruct juries that a
reasonable doubt means "a substantial doubt" or "a strong and well-founded
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CAPITAL CASES
Under article 905.3252 the death penalty may not be imposed unless
the jury, at the sentence hearing, finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. The aggra-
vating circumstances are listed in article 905.4.253 The question in State
v. Flowers54 was whether the jury should be instructed only as to those
aggravating circumstances which are supported by the evidence in the
particular case. The usual practice is simply to instruct the jury as to
the nine aggravating circumstances provided in article 905.4 and to
further instruct the jury that it must review all the evidence presented
to determine which, if any, of these circumstances have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel in this case argued that the trial
judge, together with counsel, should review both the evidence and the
statutory aggravating circumstances and then instruct the jury only as
to those which might be supported by the specific evidence presented.
Although the supreme court found this procedure to be "permissible
and desirable, ' '255 it also determined that it is not required either by
constitution or statute. It would seem to this writer that the suggested
procedure is a very worthwhile one which should be followed by trial
judges faced with sentencing hearings in capital cases. Generally, only
a small number of the statutory aggravating circumstances are supported
by the evidence and are being urged by the prosecution. It would both
aid the jury in its deliberations and accord substantial protection to the
accused to limit the jury's consideration to only those aggravating cir-
cumstances fairly supported by the evidence.
LAW VERSUS FACTS
The division of responsibility between judge and jury is normally
phrased simply to the effect that questions of law are for the trial judge
and questions of fact are to be determined solely by the jury. Like all
over-simplifications, this traditional statement presents many problems
of interpretation as to what is law and what is fact. This determination
doubt" or "a doubt for which you give a reason". The Fourteenth Amendment
requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a
crime. When a criminal defendant is convicted by proof beyond a strong or
substantial doubt, that defendant has not been afforded the full protections of
the federal Constitution. Moreover, when a jury is told that a reasonable doubt
is a doubt that can be articulated, the prosecutor's burden of proof is uncon-
stitutionally eased.
Id. at 559 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
252. La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.3.
253. La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.4.
254. 441 So. 2d 707 (La. 1983).
255. Id. at 717.
19841
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
becomes very important when considering the duty of the judge to
instruct the jury as to the law and the correlative duty of the jury to
accept the law given by the judge. 256 This crucial question was discussed
at length in excellent en banc majority, concurring and dissenting opin-
ions in the United States Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Johnson.2 "
All judges and lawyers would profit by a close reading of this entire
case.
JURY DELIBERATIONS
Article 793 states very specifically: "Testimony shall not be repeated
to the jury.""25 The supreme court has consistently applied this article
on the basis that it represents an express legislative choice which must
be followed. 2 9 The reason usually stated for the prohibition on repeating
testimony is the fear that the jury may over-emphasize the portion of
the testimony which is read to them and that undue weight may thus
be given to a limited portion of the overall testimony presented in the
case. 260 The supreme court has once again re-affirmed its adherence to
this rule,26' but the reluctance of the court to do so is evident. Justice
Blanche, speaking for the court, expressed this feeling as follows: "Al-
though we recognize that a majority of jurisdictions permit testimony
to be re-read to the jury upon its request, the enactment of Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 793 represents an express legislative
choice in the matter. ' 262 It seems that the time has come for this
provision to be changed. It appears to this commentator entirely un-
realistic to follow this minority rule and to force jurors to rely upon
the dubious accuracy of their recollection. As criminal trials become
more complicated and more lengthy, it becomes even more absurd to
administer justice on the basis of inaccurate recollections on the part
of persons with little, if any, training in the real art of accurate listening
256. The court shall charge the jury:
(1) As to the law applicable to the case;
(2) That the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the question
of guilt or innocence, but that it has the duty to accept and to apply the law
as given by the court; and
(3) That the jury alone shall determine the weight and credibility of the evidence.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 802.
257. 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983).
258. La. Code Crim. P. art. 793.
259. State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1982); State v. Gaston, 412 So. 2d 574
(La. 1982); State v. McCully, 310 So. 2d 833 (La. 1975).
260. State v. Freetime, 303 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974).
261. State v. Johnson, 438 So. 2d 1091 (La. 1983).
262. Id. at 1102.
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and recollection. Legislative action to amend article 793 is highly de-
sirable .263
263. 3 ABA, supra note 27, std. 15-4.2(a) provides:
If the jury, after retiring for deliberation, requests a review of certain testimony
or other evidence, they shall be conducted to the courtroom. Whenever the
jury's request is reasonable, the court, after notice to the prosecutor and counsel
for the defense, shall have the.requested parts of the testimony read to the
jury and shall permit the jury to reexamine the requested materials admitted
into evidence.
See the criticism of other provisions of article 793 in Sullivan, Developments in the Law,
1982-1983-Criminal Trial Procedure, 44 La. L. Rev. 301, 329 (1983). In the federal
courts, a judge has broad discretion to re-read portions of the testimony at the request
of the jury. See United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359 (llth Cir. 1984).

